We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are n players, n ≥ 3. Each player is denoted by i. Two strategic variables are t i and s i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. They are related by invertible functions. Using the minimax theorem by Sion (1958) we will show that Nash equilibria in the following states are equivalent.
Introduction
The payoff function of Player i is u i , i ∈ N. It is written as u i (t 1 , . . . ,t n ).
We assume u i : T 1 × · · · × T n ⇒ R for each i ∈ N is continuous on T 1 × · · · × T n . Thus, it is continuous on S 1 × · · · × S n through f i , i ∈ N. It is quasi-concave on T i and S i for a strategy of each other player, and quasi-convex on T j , j = i and S j , j = i for each t i and s i .
We do not assume differentiability of the payoff functions.
Symmetry of the game means that the payoff functions of all players are symmetric and in the payoff function of each Player i, Players j and k, j, k = i, are interchangeable. f i 's and g i 's are symmetric. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values of the payoff functions of the players is zero. All T i 's are identical, and all S i 's are identical. Denote them by T and S.
Sion's minimax theorem (Sion (1958) , Komiya (1988) , Kindler (2005) ) for a continuous function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological spaces, and let f : X ×Y → R be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then We follow the description of Sion's theorem in Kindler (2005) . Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper such that m players choose t i 's and n − m players choose s i 's as their strategic variables, we have the following relations. max t i ∈T min t j ∈T u i (t i ,t j , t k , t l ) = min t j ∈T max t i ∈T u i (t i ,t j , t k , t l ).
where t k is a vector of t k , k ∈ M, of the players other than Players i and j who choose t k 's as their strategic variables. On the other hand, t l is a vector of t l , l ∈ N − M, of the players other than Player j who choose s l 's as their strategic variables. Also, relations which are symmetric to them hold. u i (t i ,t j , t k , t l ) is the payoff of Player i when Players i and j choose t i and t j . On the other hand, u i (t i ,t j (t i , s j , t k , t l ), t k , t l ) means the payoff of Player i when he chooses t i and Player j chooses s j .
Further we show the following results.
Lemma 2.
is the payoff of Player j when Players i and j choose t i and t j . On the other hand, u j (t i ,t j (t i , s j , t k , t l ), t k , t l ) means the payoff of Player j when he chooses s j and Player i chooses t i .
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where f k denotes a vector of the values of s k 's of players who choose t k 's, and s l denotes a vector of the values of s l 's of players who choose s l 's. Then, we have
where
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is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of u j ,t i (s j ) is continuous. Then, any value of t 0 j can be realized by appropriately choosing s j according to (1). Therefore,
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Then, we have
is the minimum of u j with respect to t i given the value of s j at s 0 j . We assume thatt i (t j ) = arg min t i ∈T u j (t i ,t j , t k , t l ) is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of u j ,t i (t j ) is continuous. Then, any value of s 0 j can be realized by appropriately choosing t j according to (3). Therefore,
Combining (2) and (4), we get max
Since any value of s j can be realized by appropriately choosing t j , we have max
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Therefore,
Lemma 3.
is the maximum of u i with respect to t i given s j . Let
where max t i ∈T u i (t i ,t 0 j , t k , t l ) is the maximum of u i with respect to t i given the value of t j at t 0 j . We assume thatt i (
By the maximum theorem and continuity of u i ,t i (s j ) is continuous. Then, any value of t 0 j can be realized by appropriately choosing s j according to (5). Therefore,
On the other hand, max t i ∈T u i (t i ,t j , t k , t l ) is the maximum of u i with respect to t i given t j . Lett i (t j ) = arg max t i ∈T u i (t i ,t j , t k , t l ), and fix the value of s j at
is the maximum of u i with respect to t i given the value of s j at s 0 j . We assume thatt i (t j ) = arg max t i ∈T u i (t i ,t j , t k , t l ) is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of u i ,t i (t j ) is continuous. Then, any value of s 0 j can be realized by appropriately choosing t j according to (7). Therefore,
Combining (6) and (8), we get min
Since any value of s j can be realized by appropriately choosing t j , we have min
Thus, max
The main results
In this section we present the main results of this paper. First we show Theorem 1. The equilibrium where all players choose t i 's is equivalent to the equilibrium where one player (Player j) chooses s j and all other players choose t i 's as their strategic variables.
Proof. 1. Consider a situation (t 1 , . . . ,t n ) = (t, . . .,t), that is, all players choose the same value of t i . Let
By symmetry of the game
and arg max
Consider the following function.
Since this function is continuous and T is compact, there exists a fixed point. Denote it by t * . Then, t * → arg max
We have max
2. Because the game is zero-sum,
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This means
and max
From this we get arg max
We have
By symmetry max 
This holds for all i ∈ N, i = j. 
From (12) and (13), (t * , s 0 (t * ),t * , . . . ,t * ) is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to (t * , . . . ,t * ). (t * , s 0 (t * ),t * , . . . ,t * ) denotes an equilibrium where t i = t * , s j = s 0 (t * ) and t k = t * for k = i, j.
Consider a Nash equilibrium where m players choose t * and n − m players choose s 0 (t * ). Let t k be a vector of t k , k ∈ M, of players other than i and j who choose t k 's as their strategic variables; t l be a vector of t l , l ∈ N − M, of players who choose s l 's as their strategic variables. These expressions mean that t i = t j = t * ; each t k = t * and each s l = s 0 (t * ). We write such an equilibrium as (t i ,t j , t k , t l , ) = (t * ,t * , t * k , t * l , ). In the next theorem, based on Assumption 1, we will show that such a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium where m − 1 players choose t * and n − m + 1 players choose s 0 (t * ).
Now we assume Assumption 1. At the equilibrium where m players choose t * and n − m players choose s 0 (t * ), the responses of u k and u l to a small change in t i have the same sign.
u k is the payoff of each player, other than i, whose strategic variable is t k , and u l is the payoff of each player whose strategic variable is s l .
When t i = t * and s l = s 0 (t * ) for i ∈ M, l ∈ N −M, we have t l = t * for all l ∈ N −M. u k , k ∈ M \ i and u l , l ∈ N − M respond to a change in t i , i ∈ M given t k , k ∈ M \ i and s l , l ∈ N − M. Since s k , k ∈ M \ i and t l , l ∈ N − M are not constant, the responses of u k , k ∈ M \ i and the responses of u l , l ∈ N − M to a change in t i , i ∈ M may be different. However, because all t i 's are equal and all u i 's for i ∈ N are equal at the equilibrium, we may assume that the responses of u k , i ∈ M \ i and the responses of u l , l ∈ N − M to a change in t i , i ∈ M have the same sign in a sufficiently small neighborhood of the equilibrium.
Using this assumption we show the following result.
Theorem 2. The equilibrium where m, 2 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, players choose t i 's and n − m players choose s i 's as their strategic variables is equivalent to the equilibrium where m − 1 players choose t i 's and n − m + 1 players choose s i 's as their strategic variables.
Proof. Suppose that Player i chooses t i in both equilibria, but Player j chooses t j when m players choose t i 's and he chooses s j when m − 1 players choose t i 's. Then, arg max
Since any value of t j is realized by appropriately choosing s j , we get Then,
= max
Since any value of t j is realized by appropriately choosing s j given s i = s 0 (t * ) for all i = n,
Thus, arg min
From (16) and (17) min
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Then, arg min
By (18) we get min
Therefore, arg max
This holds for all i ∈ N, i = j.
From (14) and (19) 
is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to (t * ,t * , t * k , t * l ), and hence it is equivalent to (t * , . . . ,t * ). Note that i and j are arbitrary.
By mathematical induction this theorem means that the Nash equilibrium where one player chooses t i and n − 1 players choose s i 's as their strategic variables is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium where all players choose t i 's as their strategic variables. Suppose that in the former equilibrium only Player n chooses t n and the other players choose s i 's as their strategic variables. Then, this equilibrium is denoted by (s 0 (t * ), . . ., s 0 (t * ),t * ), and so arg max
Since any value of t n is realized by appropriately choosing s n ,
is a Nash equilibrium, in which all players choose s 0 (t * ). It is equivalent to (t * , . . . ,t * ).
Summarizing the results we have shown Theorem 3. Nash equilibria in the following states are equivalent.
1. All players choose t i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (as their strategic variables).
2. Some players choose t i 's and the other players choose s i 's.
3. All players choose s i , i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
Example of an asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game
Consider a relative profit maximization game in an oligopoly with three firms producing differentiated goods 1 . It is an example of multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. The firms are A, B and C. The strategic variables are the outputs and the prices of the goods of the firms. We consider the following four cases.
1. Case 1: All firms determine their outputs.
The inverse demand functions are
where 0 < b < 1. p A , p B and p C are the prices of the goods of Firm A, B and C, and x A , x B and x C are the outputs of them.
2. Case 2: Firms A and B determine their outputs, and Firm C determines the price of its good.
From the inverse demand functions,
and
3. Case 3: Firms B and C determine the prices of their goods, and Firm A determines its output.
Also, from the above inverse demand functions, we obtain We can show the same result for the equilibrium prices of the goods of the other firms. Thus, in a fully symmetric game the four cases are equivalent. It can be verified that this example with c A = c B = c C satisfies Assumption 1 in the sense that the argmin (argument of the minimum) of the relative profit of Firm B with respect to the strategy of Firm A is equal to that of Firm C with the Nash equilibrium strategies of Firms B and C in Case 2 and Case 3. See (15a) and (15b).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that in a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables, choice of strategic variables is irrelevant to the Nash equilibrium. In an asymmetric situation the Nash equilibrium depends on the choice of strategic variables by players other than two-players case 2 .
